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Abstract
This paper studies a closed economy with a continuum of agents and
moral hazard. Economic agents in the economy operate a stochastic produc-
tion technology with capital and labor inputs in which the latter is private
information. I characterize ecient allocations of capital, labor, and con-
sumption in a stationary recursive equilibrium for a decentralized economy
with component planners. Allocation and accumulation of capital are facil-
itated by a `capital planner' who serves as a nancial intermediary for the
component planners. In equilibrium, private information lowers the equi-
librium interest rate below agents' discount rate and I show that contrary
to the private-information endowment economies, a moral-hazard produc-
tive economy can exhibit both endogenous lower and upper bounds on the
stationary distribution of utility entitlements.
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11 Introduction
This paper studies a general equilibrium model of a closed economy with het-
erogeneous agents and moral hazard. The agents operate independent stochastic
production technologies with capital and labor inputs in which the latter is private
information. I characterize the information-constrained optimal allocations of re-
sources and the conditions for which a stationary equilibrium in a closed economy
exhibits an endogenous interest rate with capital accumulation and an invariant,
non-degenerate distribution of resources and utility entitlements.
The rst contribution of this paper lies in its incorporation of a general pro-
duction technology into the private-information, moral hazard economy with het-
erogeneous agents. I decentralize the economy by using the concept of component
planners who trade capital among themselves according to the willingness of their
agents to supply labor eort. The component planners rent capital from a nan-
cial intermediary called `capital planner' at an endogenously determined market-
clearing interest rate. As the surplus of each component planner in each period is
invested at the capital planner as the next period capital stock, the capital planner
also facilitates capital accumulation. Previous models with private information and
capital accumulation have imposed severe restrictions on preferences and technol-
ogy (as in Khan and Ravikumar (1997a) or Khan and Ravikumar (1997b)). In my
decentralized economy with capital planner, not only are all variables endogenous
but there are also no special restrictions on preferences, production technology,
information structure, or contracts. I conrm the nding of Kehoe and Levine
(1993) or Atkeson and Lucas (1995) and show that moral hazard also lowers the
equilibrium interest rate below the discount rate of the agents.
Second, I prove that a moral-hazard production economy can exhibit endoge-
nous lower and upper bound on its stationary distribution of utility entitlements.
This feature contrasts with the necessity of imposing an exogenous lower bound on
utility entitlements as in Thomas and Worrall (1990), Atkeson and Lucas (1992),
or Phelan (1995) who motivate the exogenous lower bound by the inability of the
agents to forego future consumption or by competition among planners.
2My arguments extend the ndings of Aiyagari and Alvarez (1995) who intro-
duce the concept of `misery', the lowest available utility forever. If misery is not
incentive compatible, the distribution of utility entitlements is non-degenerate as
far as the consumption set is compact and the technology suciently productive to
pay for the input costs and consumption of the agent. Moreover, if the planners'
cost function is decreasing at the lowest levels of utility entitlements, the lower
bound on the stationary distribution will be endogenous: the Pareto-improving
policy is to move to the non-decreasing part of the cost function where the agent
is better o and the planner incurs a lower cost. The endogenous upper bound fol-
lows from the planners' intertemporal tradeo of resources at an interest rate lower
than the agent's discount rate. Thus the ergodic set in a moral hazard produc-
tion economy can be quite dierent from those in economies with an endowment
technology or truth-telling constraints. Numerical simulations in Bohacek (2000)
conrm these analytical results.
The paper analyzes allocations and distribution of resources in a dynamic,
general equilibrium model of a closed economy with many agents and moral hazard.
It builds on the seminal contributions of Atkeson and Lucas (1992, 1995), Aiyagari
and Alvarez (1995) and the growing literature on computable general equilibrium
models with heterogeneous agents. The other important stream of the literature
has focused on partial equilibrium principal-agent models as in Green (1987), Spear
and Srivastava (1987), Atkeson (1991), Phelan and Townsend (1991), or Lehnert,
Ligon, and Townsend (1998). In these models the principal usually has access to
outside funds at an exogenously given price.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next Section, I describe preferences,
production technology, the private information economy, and outline a social plan-
ner's problem. In Section 3, I follow Atkeson and Lucas (1995) and decentralize
the economy using the concept of component planners and a capital planner. I
formulate the problem recursively and dene a stationary recursive equilibrium.
Optimal allocations, ergodic sets, properties of the invariant distribution, and an
algorithm for numerical simulation are characterized in Section 4. Section 5 con-
cludes. All mathematical proofs are in the Appendix.
32 A Social Planner's Problem
In this section, I formally describe the economy, state the assumptions on prefer-
ences and production function, commodity space, and information structure. Then
I present the economy as a principal-agent problem with moral hazard.
The closed economy is populated by a continuum of agents of measure one. In
each period of time t = 0;1;2;:::, each agent is endowed with one unit of time he
can divide into labor, lt, and leisure, 1   lt. At the beginning of each period, an
agent chooses labor supply to work with his capital stock, kt, accumulated over
time from an initial positive stock k0, in his production technology f(kt;lt). At
the end of the period, he divides the realized output, yt, into consumption, ct, and
investment towards the next period capital stock, kt+1, which depreciates at a rate
 2 (0;1). Each period the agent derives a separable utility from consumption and
leisure, u(ct) + v(1   lt), discounted over time at  2 (0;1).
Assumption 1 The production function f : R+ [0;1] ! R+ is concave, contin-
uously dierentiable, and homogeneous of degree one. f(0;l) = f(k;0) = 0 and
for x = fk;lg, limx!1 f0
x(k;l) = 0 and limx!0 f0
x(k;l) = 1.
With decreasing marginal productivity of capital, there exists a maximal
(golden-rule) nite level of capital stock maintained by each agent in the steady
state when labor supply is at its highest level, l = 1. Denoting this level by  k and
the set of capital stock by K = [0; k], the steady-state set of output is Y = [0;  y]
for  y = f( k;1). Finally, with consumption c 2 C = [0; c], where  c =  y    k < 1
is the maximal sustainable consumption in a steady state, all sets are compact.
Assumption 2 The functions u : [0; c] ! R and v : [0;1] ! R are twice contin-
uously dierentiable, strictly concave, strictly increasing in c and decreasing in l,
and bounded from above and below.
Agent's labor supply and capital input are related to output realizations by
an exogenous probability measure P on Borel measurable space (Y;B(Y )) where
B(Y ) denotes Borelians on Y . The number P(Ajk;l) represents the probability of
4output y being an element of A 2 B(Y ) given the inputs k 2 K and l 2 L were
employed in the production function.
Assumption 3 For each (k;l) 2 (0; k](0;1], the probability P(Ajk;l) is strictly
positive for all A 2 B(Y ).
The above assumption establishes the information asymmetry: other agents
or a social planner cannot infer with certainty an agent's labor supply from an
observed positive output (except for a zero recommended input resulting in zero
output with probability one). The output realizations drawn from this stochastic
technology are independent in time and across agents. Except for the monotone
likelihood ratio condition there are no other restrictions on the probability distri-
bution known to all agents in the economy.
The problem of each agent is to maximize his lifetime utility subject to his
budget constraint. Each agent can only employ his own labor but can trade capital
and consumption goods with other agents. Due to the stochastic technology, the
risk-averse agents would like to write insurance contracts with each other to smooth
their consumption. I will model the economy as a principal-agent problem for a
social planner with heterogeneous agents in a closed economy. It is assumed that
the planner has the ability to prevent the agents from trading with each other.
In exchange for providing the agents with insurance, the social planner cons-
cates the initial capital stock and assigns innite sequences of allocations to each
agent contingent on an agent's identication and history of output realizations. At
each date t  0, the social planner identies each agent by an initial entitlement
to expected, discounted utility w0 2 W = [w;w]  R.1 All agents identied with
the same w0 receive the same treatment. Let  0 denote the distribution of initial
expected utility entitlements on (W;B(W)) so that  0(A) represents a fraction of
the population entitled to expected discounted utility in A 2 B(W).
The realizations of each agent's stochastic technology form a history of output
yt = (y0;y1;:::;yt) 2 Y t+1 = Y0  Y1 :::  Yt. Then at date t  0, an agent
1I will discuss in detail the values of fw;wg in Section 4 when analyzing the endogenous
bounds of the stationary distribution.
5w0's consumption is a sequence of functions ct : W  Y t+1 ! [0; c], and similarly
for labor input, lt : W  Y t ! [0;1], and capital input, kt : W  Y t ! [0; k].
Denote the histories of these functions also with superscripts and dene P t+1 as


























Within this framework, at time t  0 the social planner assigns to an agent







































Dene an allocation as such a sequence  from the set of all sequences that sat-
ises the following restrictions: rst, the promise keeping constraint requiring the
sequence  to deliver the initial expected discounted utility entitlement,
w0 = U(w0;); (1)
for all w0 2 W. Second, because of the moral hazard problem, the sequence must
be incentive compatible,
U(w0;)  U(w0; ^ ); (2)
for all w0 2 W, where ^  contains any labor supply deviation ^ l 2 L from the
recommended l 2 L in any period of time.
Since the economy is populated by a continuum of agents, at the beginning of
each period, the social planner is required to divide the whole aggregate capital
































  Kt+1   (1   )  Kt: (4)
This equation also serves as the law of motion for the capital stock: all goods
produced but not consumed by the agents are added by the social planner to the
depreciated current capital stock.
The rest of the paper is devoted to characterization of ecient allocations
and distribution of utility entitlements in a stationary recursive equilibrium for a
decentralized economy with component planners and a nancial intermediary.
3 A Decentralized Recursive Formulation
Following Atkeson and Lucas (1995), the problem of nding the ecient alloca-
tions can be partially decentralized by using prices and the concept of `component
planners', each responsible for allocating resources only to agents entitled to an
initial utility entitlement w0. Each component planner chooses an allocation that
attains the utility entitlement of his subpopulation in such a way as to minimize
the cost of attaining w0 evaluated at prices he trades with the other component
planners.
Specically, the component planners borrow and lend capital inputs according
to the willingness of their agents to supply labor eort. One can imagine the capital
trading intermediated by a zero-prot nancial intermediary called the `capital
planner'. All component planners deposit their initial capital stocks of their agents
with the capital planner who then lends the capital back to the component planners
in each period at a market-clearing price rt+. In other words, the capital planner
announces a sequence of interest rates frtg1
t=0 such that the gross-of-depreciation
7rate of return on capital is equal across the component planners and the whole
capital stock is lent out in each period. All loans are repaid at the end of each
period and the component planners invest at the capital planner all goods produced
but not consumed by the agents as the next-period aggregate capital stock.
Given the interest rate sequence frtg1
t=0, a component planner assigned to
subpopulation w0 2 W chooses an allocation sequence r such that it minimizes
the cost of resources
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subject to the promise keeping (1) and the incentive compatibility (2) constraints.
Again, the capital stock must be distributed between agents in each period and
allocations of all component planners must be feasible in the closed economy. It
is straightforward to apply the First Welfare Theorem as in Atkeson and Lucas
(1992) in order to establish the eciency outcome of the component planning
problem.
There is no general method of solving for the whole interest rate sequence
frtg1
t=0 that would clear the market among the component planners. However, a
steady state of the decentralized economy will exhibit a constant interest rate r at
which the optimal allocation policies r lead to an invariant distribution of utility
entitlements  r that satisfy the market-clearing conditions for a closed economy
with constant aggregate capital stock  Kr.
In the recursive formulation the state variable of each component planner is
only the utility entitlement w that summarizes the history of output realizations of
his subpopulation at the beginning of each period. An agent is now assigned inputs
k(w) and l(w) as functions of the current utility entitlement, while consumption
c(w;y) and the continuation utility entitlement w0(w;y), the next-period state
variable, are also contingent on the realization of output.
8In the steady state, the capital planner rents the accumulated stock of capi-
tal  Kr to the component planners at a constant interest rate r. Each component
planner borrows an ecient amount of capital input according to his agent's will-
ingness to supply labor input. At the end of each period, all component planners
pay for their capital loans (r+)k(w) and deposit all remaining surplus y c(w;y)
at the capital planner: in the steady state, the aggregate surplus exactly equals
the depreciated capital stock   Kr.
Therefore, for a constant interest rate r, dene an allocation policy of a com-
ponent planner associated with subpopulation w 2 W as
r  fk(w);l(w);c(w;y);w
0(w;y)g
where k : W ! [0; k], l : W ! [0;1], c : W Y ! [0; c], and w0 : W Y ! R. The
objective of each component planner is to minimize the present value of resources
needed to provide an honest agent with a lifetime utility w at interest rate r. For
intertemporal price of resources 1=(1 + r) and all w 2 W, dene a value function
Vr : W ! R for the component planning problem and an operator Tr on the space


















fu(c(w;y)) + v(1   l(w)) + w
0(w;y)g P(dyjk(w);l(w)); (6)
and the incentive constraint for all (l;^ l) 2 L  L,
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fu(c(w;y)) + v(1   ^ l) + w
0(w;y)gP(dyjk(w);^ l); (7)
where ^ l 2 L represents any deviation from the recommended labor eort.
In a stationary recursive equilibrium, the allocation of all individual component
planners must lead to an invariant distribution of utility entitlements. For that
9purpose dene a probability measure r from the set  of all probability measures
on (W;B(W)), and a transition function Fr : W  B(W) ! [0;1]. With Fr(w;A)
representing a probability that an agent with a current utility entitlement w 2 W
will be entitled to w0 belonging to A 2 B(W) next period, the probability measure




Fr(w;A)r(dw) for all A 2 B(W): (8)





and the market clearing condition requires that the allocation policies of all com-
ponent planners are feasible in the closed economy with constant aggregate capital
stock, Z
WY
fy   c(w;y)g P(dyjk(w);l(w))r(dw) =   Kr: (10)
It is now possible to state the denition of a stationary recursive equilibrium.
Denition 1 A stationary recursive equilibrium for the decentralized economy is
a constant interest rate r, a value function Vr, an allocation policy r, a probability
measure r, and a law of motion for aggregate capital stock  Kr, such that
1. at interest rate r, for all w 2 W, the allocation policy r minimizes the
objective function of each component planner (5) subject to the constraints
(6) and (7);
2. the probability measure r is invariant (8);
3. the aggregate capital stock (9) is constant with  Kr < 1;
4. and the market-clearing condition (10) holds.
Finally, it follows from Theorems 9.2 in Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989) that
at a constant interest rate, the optimal allocations of the recursive and sequential
formulations are equivalent.
104 Characterization of Optimal Allocations
In this section I study the existence, uniqueness as well as the properties of the
optimal allocation and the stationary distribution of utility entitlements in the
steady state of the decentralized economy. All proofs are in the Appendix.
In general, models with moral hazard exhibit non-convexity of the constraint set
for the component planner's problem. This property can be regained by lotteries as
in Phelan and Townsend (1991). With lotteries, the choice of a component planner
associated with agents entitled to w 2 W is a probability measure (k;l;y;c;w0jw)
over all points in K LY C W. Following Prescott and Townsend (1984), I
show that conditional on recommended inputs and output realization, the proba-
bility measure (c;w0jk;l;y;w) puts all mass on a single point in the consumption
and continuation utility entitlement set.
Proposition 1 With lotteries, the operator Tr has a unique xed point Vr in
the space of bounded, continuous functions D(W) and for all V 2 D(W),
limn!1 T n
r V ! Vr. For a strictly convex V 2 D(W) and all w 2 W, the minimum
of the component planner's problem is attained by a unique continuous policy func-
tion . Conditional on (k;l;y) 2 K LY there exists a pair of (c;w0) 2 C W
such that the optimal policy (c;w0jk;l;y;w) = 1 for every w 2 W.
Thus for a strictly convex value function, the minimum of the component plan-
ner problem is attained by unique continuous policy functions c(w;y) and w0(w;y)
for each input choice, k(w) and l(w), and a realized output, y. This result allows
me to take the rst order conditions with respect to consumption and continua-
tion utility entitlements which are both important for studying the existence and
properties of the stationary recursive equilibrium.
Lemma 1 For all w 2 W,
1. w0(w;y) and c(w;y) are increasing functions of w for all y 2 Y ;
2. w0(w;y) and c(w;y) are increasing functions of y for all l 2 (0;1].
11That consumption and the continuation utility entitlement are increasing func-
tions of the current utility entitlement and that agents are rewarded for a high
output realization (except for l = 0 when the allocations are independent of out-
put) are standard results of the private information literature. With continuation
utility entitlements increasing (decreasing) for agents who realized high (low) out-
put, there is a need to study the existence and properties of the ergodic set for the
invariant distribution of utility entitlements.
Recall that Green (1987) and Thomas and Worrall (1990) established that
without a lower bound the utility entitlements converge to minus innity with
probability one. Following the result of Aiyagari and Alvarez (1995), I assume that
the consumption set is compact, c 2 [0; c]; where  c < 1, and show that it is not
incentive compatible to drive an agent to the lower bound of this consumption set:
an agent oered a zero consumption forever cannot be motivated to supply positive
labor eort. It follows that the stationary distribution of utility entitlements will
have at least this exogenous lower bound at the utility entitlement corresponding
to repeated zero consumption and full leisure.
Next, the stationary distribution of utility entitlements is non-degenerate pro-
vided there exists an incentive compatible positive labor supply for which the tech-
nology is productive enough to pay for the capital input and current consumption
of the agent. Then the cost-minimizing component planners assign positive labor
supply and reward their agents by an increased next-period utility entitlement for
a high output realization (and vice versa for a low one).
Moreover, if the planners' cost function is decreasing at the lowest levels of
utility entitlements (which implies that incentive-compatible labor supply and ex-
pected output are increasing), both planner and agent are better o by moving to
the Pareto frontier in the non-decreasing part of the cost function: the distribution
of utility entitlements has an endogenous lower bound w where the convex cost
function has its minimum. Endogeneity of the upper bound w follows from the
intertemporal tradeo of resources: its existence is guaranteed for an interest rate
lower than the agent's discount rate.
In order to study the existence of lower and upper bounds on the stationary
12distribution of utility entitlements, it is convenient to set the (non-binding) ex-
ogenous upper bound at a utility entitlement corresponding to a perpetual utility
from full leisure and the highest consumption, w  (1   ) 1fu( c) + v(1)g, where
 c =  y    k < 1 is the maximal sustainable consumption in a steady state.
Second, dene wm as forever repeated assignment of zero consumption and zero
leisure, wm  (1 ) 1fu(0)+v(0)g. Aiyagari and Alvarez (1995) call this utility
entitlement `misery' and show that if misery is not incentive compatible, there is a
non-degenerate distribution of utility entitlements in a steady state. It is obvious
that an agent assigned zero consumption and future misery with certainty cannot
be asked to supply any positive labor eort: the incentive constraint u(0)+v(0)+
wm  u(0)+v(1 ^ l)+wm; reveals that misery is not incentive compatible for any
recommended l > 0 and that the only incentive-compatible allocation associated
with forever repeated zero consumption is full leisure. Therefore, the exogenous
lower bound on the stationary distribution is w  (1   ) 1fu(0) + v(1)g.
The component planner associated with agents entitled to w can deliver this
utility entitlement in two ways. He can either assign zero consumption and full
leisure for all periods with cost V (w) = 0, or, if it is less costly, an incentive-
compatible positive labor supply and non-zero consumption together with an in-
creased continuation utility in case of a high realization of output.
The planner will choose the rst option if the technology is not productive
enough for the incentive-compatible labor supply to repay the cost of capital input
and consumption of the agent. Then the optimal, cost-minimizing allocations
of continuation utility entitlements will drive all agents to w provided that the
interest rate is lower than the time preference of the agents,  =
1 
 .
Lemma 2 If the incentive compatible allocation at w results in a positive cur-
rent cost,
R
Y fc(w;y) + (r + )k   ygP(dyjk(w);l(w)) > 0; then the only feasible
stationary distribution of utility entitlements is degenerate at w with interest rate
r 2 (0;).
For optimal labor supply policy l(w) = 0 the continuation utility entitlement
policy follows V 0(w0(w;0)) = (1+r)V 0(w) and with r 2 (0;) the lower bound w
13becomes an absorbing point. If r =  the agents stay at their initial entitlements
while if the interest rate is greater than the discount factor, all agents will be
eventually driven to the exogenous upper bound. Neither equilibrium is feasible
since there is positive consumption with zero output.
The stationary distribution of utility entitlements will exhibit mobility if the
planner can choose the second, productive option, i.e., if the technology is su-
ciently productive to repay the cost of capital input and the consumption reward
for incentive-compatible labor supply l(w) > 0. The endogeneity of the lower
bound depends on the shape of the cost function. Denoting w 2 [w;w] as the
minimum of the convex cost function, the lower bound will be endogenous at
w > w if the cost function is decreasing in w 2 [w;w). On the other hand, the
lower bound will be exogenous at w = w if the cost function is non-decreasing
in all w 2 [w;w]: For example, a general-equilibrium extension of the numerical
simulation in Phelan and Townsend (1991) would lead to a stationary distribution
with an endogenous lower bound.
Whether the cost function is initially decreasing depends on the properties of
the production and utility functions. The cost function decreases in w 2 [w;w)
if the one-period cost is also decreasing, which requires the incentive compatible
labor supply and expected output to be increasing in the same interval. As before,
the technology must be suciently productive to repay the cost of capital input
and the consumption reward. The next Lemma shows that in the decreasing part
of the cost function the planner can reduce his cost at the same time as making
the agent better o by assigning a continuation utility in the non-decreasing part
of the cost function, w0(w;y)  w.
Lemma 3 If the current cost
R
Y fc(w;y) + (r + )k   ygP(dyjk(w);l(w)) < 0 is
decreasing in w 2 [w;w), the planners' cost function V (w) is decreasing in w 2
[w;w) and the optimal continuation utility policy assigns w0(w;y)  w for all
w 2 [w;w) and y 2 Y .
For the either type (exogenous or endogenous) of the lower bound w, I will

























Figure 1: Example of continuation utility policy functions for high and low output
realizations at interest rate r 2 (0;) with endogenous ergodic set [w;w].
Lemmas 4 and 5 analyze the behavior of continuation utility policies for w 2
[w;w]. Without loss of generality I consider the highest and the lowest level of
output realizations, y and y(= 0); respectively.
Lemma 4 For interest rate r 2 (0;), all inputs (k;l) 2 K  L and a low output
realization y 2 Y ,
1. w0(w;y) = w for w = w; and
2. w0(w;y) < w for w > w.
Lemma 5 For interest rate r 2 (0;), all inputs (k;l) 2 K L and a high output
realization y 2 Y , there exists utility entitlement w 2 (w;w) such that
1. w0(w;y) > w for w < w;
2. w0(w;y) = w for w = w; and
3. w0(w;y) < w for w > w.
If r  ;w0(w;y)  w for all w 2 W.
The continuation entitlement policies for an endogenous lower and upper
bounds with interest rate r 2 (0;) are illustrated in Figure 1. For such an interest
15rate and a suciently productive technology, there exists a non-degenerate invari-
ant distribution of utility entitlements that satises the conditions of stationary
recursive equilibria. For all w 2 (w;w), the planners punish agents with a low
output realization by a lower continuation utility and reward agents with a high
output realization by increasing their utility entitlement from tomorrow on. It is
not cost ecient to punish agents below w and reward them beyond w. These
results follow from the component planner's intertemporal tradeo of resources















where the value function is convex, (1 + r) < 1 if r 2 (0;), the Lagrange multi-
plier (w) on the incentive constraint is positive, and the ratio P(yjk;^ l)=P(yjk;l) is
a decreasing function of output for any downward deviation on labor eort ^ l 2 L.
Theorem 1 If
R
Y fc(w;y) + (r + )k   ygP(dyjk(w);l(w)) < 0 and the inter-
est rate r 2 (0;), there exists a non-degenerate stationary distribution of utility
entitlements in the ergodic set [w;w] with an endogenous upper bound. If the
cost function is initially decreasing in w, the lower bound is endogenous as well.
First, the analysis conrms the results of Kehoe and Levine (1993), Huggett
(1997) and Lucas (1992) that in a private information economy the market clearing
interest rate is less than the agents' time preference. If the component planner
discounts the future more than the agents, i.e., if r  , he tends to shift his costs
into the future by promising higher continuation utility. On the other hand, if
r 2 (0;), the component planner cares about the future more than the agents
and does not overuse future resources for current incentives.
Second, contrary to the private-information endowment economies, the lower
bound of the ergodic set can be endogenous too. This result follows from the
Pareto-improving allocations at the lowest levels of utility entitlements for an ini-
tially decreasing cost function. The only requirement is that the planners' cost
function is initially decreasing in w and the technology be suciently protable
16to pay for the cost of capital input and current consumption of the agent. If the
technology does not cover the cost of production and consumption of the agent, the
only feasible stationary distribution is degenerate at the exogenous lower bound
with interest rate again lower than the discount factor of the agents.
It remains to study the relationship between the outside transfers and invariant
distribution  r of utility entitlements for dierent levels of interest rate. Since the
policies for continuation utility determine the invariant distribution, the behavior
of  r with respect to the interest rate depends on the relationship between w0(w;y)
and interest rate r.
First, arguments in Atkeson and Lucas (1995) and Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott
(1989) can be used to establish that Vr and w0
r(w;y) vary continuously in the
interest rate. Following Krueger (1999) I will show that the higher the interest rate,
the more the component planners shift cost to the future by oering their agents
a higher continuation utility in exchange for a lower level of current consumption.
Lemma 6 The optimal policy w0(w;y) is increasing and the optimal policy c(w;y)
is decreasing in r, respectively.
Because the invariant distribution is determined by the continuation utility
policies, a higher interest rate leads to an invariant distribution with more mass
on higher utility entitlements.
Lemma 7 If r > ^ r then  r   ^ r.
Finally, in numerical simulations one has to nd a market-clearing interest rate.
For that purpose dene an aggregate decit of all the component planners in one




fc(w;y) + k(w)   ygP(dyjk(w);l(w))r(dw):
The last Lemma shows that the aggregate decit is a decreasing function of the
interest rate.
Lemma 8 ( r) is increasing in r.
17Thus during numerical simulations the iteration on interest rate proceeds ac-
cording to the following algorithm: 1. Guess an initial interest rate; 2. Find the
optimal policies for all component planners and the invariant distribution of util-
ity entitlements; 3. If the component planners spend more on consumption and
investment than the agents produce (( r) > 0), repeat with a lower interest rate
(and vice versa for a surplus). Numerical simulations of dierent moral hazard
economies are carried in Bohacek (2000).
5 Conclusions
This paper shows how to incorporate capital into private information economies
using the concept of a nancial intermediary, a `capital planner'. Such a frame-
work allows modeling general equilibrium economies with capital accumulation
and private information without any restrictive assumptions on functional forms
of production technology or preferences. An interesting extension could follow Fer-
nandes and Phelan (2000) method of incorporating serially correlated productivity
shocks into private information dynamic models.
Analysis of a closed economy with moral hazard and heterogeneous agents
shows that with a suciently productive technology there is no need for imposing
exogenous lower bound on utility entitlements in order to obtain a non-degenerate
stationary distribution in a steady state. This feature can be used in analysis of
distribution and allocation of resources in closed economies under dierent infor-
mation constraints and contractual framework, including dierent eciency levels
of nancial intermediation or various degrees of welfare state policies and social
insurance provided by the government.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The arguments follow the appendix to Phelan and Townsend (1991). With lotteries, the
problem is a minimization of a continuous function V over a compact, non-empty set
by applying the operator Tr. The minimum exists because the objective function is an
integral over bounded continuous functions, dened on K  L  Y  C  W0. TrV is
continuous by the Theorem of the Maximum. Since r > 0, the operator Tr satises the
hypotheses of Blackwell's theorem and is a contraction mapping of modulus 1=(1 + r).
Spear and Srivastava (1987) show in Proposition 4.4 that the value function is strictly
convex.
The proof of optimal conditional allocation (c;w0jk;l;y;w) = 1 for every w 2 W
is based on Prescott and Townsend (1984). At the market-clearing interest rate r, the
problem of a component planner, assigned to agent w, is to choose rewards in terms
of consumption and continuation utility entitlement, (c;w0) 2 C  W, conditional on a
input-output combination (k;l;y) 2 K  L  Y . The component planner's choice now























(k;l;y;c;w0jw)fu(c) + v(1   l) + w0g = w; (11)
















20and the probability measure condition,
X
CW0
(k;l;y;c;w0jw) = 1: (13)
Denote  as the Lagrange multiplier on the promise keeping constraint (11),  on
the incentive constraint (12), and  on the probability condition (13). Recall that the
technology P(yjk;l) > 0 is xed for all combinations of inputs and outputs. The rst
order condition with respect to (k;l;y;jw) is:






















First note that the above condition must hold at equality for some (c;w0) 2 C  W.
If it did not, all probabilities (k;l;y;c;w0jw) would be zero, violating the summation
constraint (13).
Now analyze the left-hand side of (14), as a function of (c;w0). The Lagrange mul-
tipliers must be such that this function has a minimum at zero, at points where (14)
holds at equality. Suppose that the set CW is very large so that the maximal distance
between any two points is arbitrarily small. Recall that the utility function is strictly
concave, increasing function in both arguments and V is strictly convex function. Dene







Then if x  0, 1+(1+r) 1V 0(w0) x(u0(c)+) > 0; since all terms but x are positive.
Then the left-hand side of (14) is strictly increasing function of (c;w0) within the non-
decreasing part of the planners' cost function.
If x > 0, the Hessian matrix for (14) is positive denite, jHj =  (1 +
r) 1V 00
r (w0)xu00(c) > 0; and the left-hand side of (14) is strictly convex function of (c;w0).
In both cases the left-hand side of (14) attains a minimum at a single combination of
rewards (c;w0) 2 C  W.
Therefore, for each pair of recommended inputs, the probability measure puts all
mass on single combination of the rewards (c;w0) 2 C  W conditional on assigned
inputs and realization of output. These points only depend on the utility entitlement
level w, interest rate r, technology specication and parameters of the model.
Assuming interior solutions in a suciently large set C W, so that the allocations
satisfy the appropriate conditions for maxima as if C  W were a continuum, it is pos-



























r(w0(w;y)) = (1 + r): (17)
In case when the lowest labor supply is recommended to the agent, these conditions
simplify to u0(c(w))V 0
r(w) = 1 and V 0
r(w0(w)) = (1 + r)V 0
r(w):
To summarize, a component planner associated with agents entitled to w 2 W
chooses input combination (k;l) 2 argmin(k0;l0)2KL Vr(w;(k0;l0)) with unique rewards
(c;w0) 2 C  W for each realization of output y 2 Y .
(Note: Even if the component planners ex ante randomized in inputs, the uniqueness
of optimal (c;w0) for each pair of (k;l) suces for all proofs in the paper since the
randomization results in a convex combination of rewards (c;w0).) 2
Proof of Lemma 1
The combination of the rst order conditions for consumption (15) and continuation
utility (16) obtains u0(c(w;y))V 0
r(w0(w;y)) = (1+r): In the non-decreasing part of the
cost function u0 > 0 and concave while V 0
r > 0 and convex, so that c(w;y) and w0(w;y)
move in the same direction as w changes. Suppose, as a contradiction, that both c(w;y)
and w0(w;y) are decreasing functions of w, so that for w  ^ w < w  w, c( ^ w;y) > c(w;y)
and w0( ^ w;y) > w0(w;y) for all y 2 Y . Then from the promise-keeping constraint
w = u(c(w;y)) + v(1   l) + w0(w;y) < u(c( ^ w;y)) + v(1   l) + w0( ^ w;y) = ^ w
which contradicts the initial assumption that ^ w < w. Therefore, c(w;y) and w0(w;y)
are both increasing functions of w for all y 2 Y .
To prove the second claim of the Lemma, note rst that for l = 0, there is no incentive
compatibility constraint and the rst order conditions become
u0(c(w;y))V 0
r(w) = 1 and V 0
r(w0(w;y)) = (1 + r)V 0
r(w);
respectively, with c(w;y) and w0(w;y) independent of output realization.
For l > 0, the incentive compatibility constraint binds and the rst order conditions
are as in the proof of Proposition 1, equations (15) and (16), respectively. Since the
utility is increasing and concave in consumption and increasing in leisure, (w) > 0 by
Lemma 1 in Jewitt (1988). Recall that P(yjk;^ l)=P(yjk;l) ratio is a decreasing function
of y for any deviating strategy ^ l < l at the given level of recommended inputs. Then for
all w 2 W, w0(w;y) > w0(w;y) and c(w;y) > c(w;y) for all w 2 W and y;y 2 Y , such
that y > y. 2
22Proof of Lemma 2
If the cost-minimizing optimal allocation at w assigns l(w) = 0, there is no consumption
and no output. Then for r 2 (0;] the rst-order intertemporal condition V 0(w0(w;0)) =
(1 + r)V 0(w) implies that at the lower bound w0(w;0) = w and V (w) = 0. For a cost
function non-decreasing in w 2 W any other allocation would lead to a higher current
and future costs and would not be optimal.
Then w is an absorbing point rather than a reecting barrier for r 2 (0;) and
the distribution puts the mass of all agents at w since for l(w) = 0 the continuation
utilities w0(w;0) < w for all w 2 W and r 2 (0;); for l(w) > 0 the probability of low
output, and therefore, decreasing continuation utility, is positive for all w 2 W. This
equilibrium is feasible since all agents neither produce nor consume. For interest rate
r   the continuation utility policies would be nondecreasing in w and the stationary
distribution would exhibit no mobility at utility entitlements with positive consumption
and zero output (see Lemmas 4 and 5 for details). 2
Proof of Lemma 3
First consider the optimal continuation policy function for w 2 [w;w) provided that the
cost function is decreasing with a minimum at w. Consider l 2 (0;1] and, without loss of
generality, y;y 2 Y such that y > y. For w 2 [w;w), denote fw0
(w;y);c(w;y);V(w)g
as allocations and value associated with continuation policies w0
(w;y)  w0
(w;y) = w.
Correspondingly, denote fw0(w;y);c(w;y);V (w)g as allocations and value associated
with continuation policies w0(w;y) < w  w0(w;y). Let both allocations satisfy the
promise keeping and incentive constraints.
Rewrite the intertemporal rst order condition as V 0
r(w0(w;y)) = (1 + r)[V 0
r(w) +
(Pl(yjk;l)=P(yjk;l)] where Pl(yjk;l) = @P(yjk;l)=@l: For a given l(w), integra-
tion with respect to P(dyjk(w);l(w)) delivers
R
Y V (w0(w;y))P(dyjk(w);l(w)) =




Y w0(w;y)P(dyjk(w);l(w)) and w0(w;y) > w0






for continuation utility policies w0(w;y) < w = w0
(w;y)  w0
(w;y) < w0(w;y)




Y V (w0(w;y))P(dyjk(w);l(w)): Then V(w) <
V (w) and the cost-minimizing allocations assign w0(w;y)  w for any w 2 [w;w),
all y 2 Y and any positive labor supply l 2 (0;1]. For l = 0 the continuation utility and
consumption rewards do not depend on output and similar arguments lead to optimal
w0(w;y) = w0(w) = w for all w 2 [w;w).
With consumption policy function c(w;y) increasing, convex in w for all
y 2 Y and production function increasing, concave in l, the one-period cost R
Y fc(w;y) + (r + )k   ygP(dyjk(w);l(w)) is decreasing, convex function only for an
increasing l(w) in w 2 [w;w) and increasing expected output. If planners can also
achieve current negative cost,
R
Y fc(w;y) + (r + )k   ygP(dyjk(w);l(w)) < 0, the cost
function is also decreasing in w 2 [w;w). 2
23Proof of Lemma 4
It is not possible to assign w0(w;y) < w if the lower bound is exogenously set at w.
Lemma 3 proved that it is not optimal to assign a continuation utility lower than the
endogenous lower bound w.
To study optimal continuation utility entitlement policies for the strictly increasing
part of the cost function at w 2 (w;w] when a low output is realized, consider rst
the case when l = 0. There is no incentive problem and the rst order intertemporal
condition equals V 0
r(w0(w;y)) = (1 + r)V 0
r(w): Then for V 0
r(w) > 0, w0(w;y))  w if
r   and w0(w;y)) < w if r 2 (0;). In case that l > 0 the incentive constraint binds
and (w) > 0: Then the intertemporal rst order condition is
V 0










When y = y, the ratio P(yjk;^ l)=P(yjk;l) > 1 for any downward deviation ^ l 2 L. Hence
the term multiplying the positive Lagrange multiplier is negative and for r 2 (0;) the
continuation utility entitlement decreases, w0(w;y) < w for all w > w: 2
Proof of Lemma 5
First, consider the case when l = 0. Then the output is zero with certainty and the rst
order intertemporal condition is V 0
r(w0(w;y)) = (1+r)V 0
r(w); so that for the increasing
part of the cost function, w0(w;y)  w if r   and w0(w;y) < w if r 2 (0;).
In case that l > 0 the incentive constraint binds and (w) > 0: For the high output
level the ratio P(yjk;^ l)=P(yjk;l) < 1 for any downward deviation ^ l 2 L. Recall the
denition of the highest utility entitlement, w  u(c)+v(1)+w0: Since for any y 2 Y ,
w0(w;y) < w for all w 2 W when l = 0 and r 2 (0;), the highest possible utility
entitlement is not sustainable if l = 0 and is not attainable if l > 0.
In the latter case suppose that an agent begins with some arbitrary initial entitlement
w < w, corresponding to some c < c and l > 0. Since the highest continuation utility
w is not attainable, he can be promised w0 = w    for some  > 0, i.e., he begins with
a promised utility w = u(c) + v(1   l) + (w   ): The component planner's rst order
intertemporal condition (15) becomes
V 0










For establishing the endogenous upper bound on utility entitlement, suppose that the
agent's utility entitlement increased to w0(w;y) = w    > w. The argument can be
repeated for a sequence of periods until an entitlement w = w   , with  > 0, is
reached at which w0 = w    = w, i.e., w = w    = u(c) + v(1   l) + (w   ):
Since c 2 C and l 2 (0;1] were arbitrary optimal allocations, for r 2 (0;) there
24exists a utility entitlement w 2 (w;w) for which w0(w;y) = w, i.e.,
V 0










For utility entitlements w < w the continuation utility entitlement increases to
w0(w;y) > w, and for w > w decreases w0(w;y) < w. When r  , w0(w;y)  w for
all w 2 W. 2
Proof of Theorem 1
See Lemmas 2 - 5. For the proof of convergence to the unique invariant probability
measure r from an arbitrary probability measure 0, see Theorem 3.2 and Lemma
11.11 in Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989). 2
Proof of Lemma 6
Let r > ^ r and show w0
r(w;y)  w0
^ r(w;y) and cr(w;y)  c^ r(w;y): Dene fV ng1
n=1 by
V n = (Tn
^ r )Vr. Let (cn(w;y);w0
n(w;y)) and (cr(w;y);w0
r(w;y)) be the optimal policies














n=1 uniformly converges to (V^ r;w0




n(w;y) and cr(w;y)  cn(w;y): (19)
First, let n = 1, w 2 [w;w]; and assume as a contradiction that for all y 2
Y;w0
r(w;y)  w0
1(w;y). From the rst order conditions,
V 0
r(w0









The strict convexity of Vr, together with the assumption that r > ^ r and w0
r(w;y) 
w0
1(w;y), imply that V 0
r(w0
1(w;y)) > V 0
r(w0
r(w;y)) and c1(w;y) > cr(w;y).





u(c(w;y)) + v(1   l(w)) + w0(w;y)
	
P(dyjk(w);l(w));
there must exist a ~ y 2 Y such that w0
r(w; ~ y) > w0




r(w; ~ y)) = (1 + r)
1
u0(cr(w; ~ y))







r(w; ~ y) < w0
1(w; ~ y), a contradiction. Therefore, w0
r(w;y)  w0
1(w;y) for
all y 2 Y . The promise keeping constraint implies cr(w;y)  c1(w;y), for all y 2 Y .
The envelope condition yields (1 + r)V 0
r(w)  (1 + ^ r)V 0
1(w).
Second, suppose that (19) hold for n   1. I want to show that the same is true also
for n. By contradiction, suppose that for all y 2 Y;w0
r(w;y)  w0
n(w;y). Again, from
the rst order conditions,
(V n 1)0(w0
n(w;y)) = (1 + ^ r)
1
u0(cn(w;y))
; and V 0
r(w0




Since V n 1 and Vr are convex, together with the assumption that r > ^ r and w0
r(w;y) 
w0
n(w;y), it follows that cn(w;y) > cr(w;y). Again, by the promise-keeping constraint,
there must exist a ~ y 2 Y such that w0
r(w; ~ y) > w0




(1 + ^ r)
(V n 1)0(w0





r(w; ~ y)) = V 0
r(w);
which implies w0
r(w; ~ y) < w0
n(w; ~ y), a contradiction. Therefore, w0
r(w;y)  w0
n(w;y) for
all y 2 Y . The promise keeping constraint implies cr(w;y)  cn(w;y), for all y 2 Y . 2
Proof of Lemma 7
Dene the sequence f ng1
n=1 by  n = (^ T^ r)n r and prove by induction that for each
n  1 and each y 2 Y ,  r stochastically dominates  n. Since by f ng1
n=1 converges to
f ^ rg1
n=1 in total variation. Dene  
y
n as the distribution function associated with  n by
 
y
n : W ! [0;1], where  
y
n(w) =  n([w;w]) for all y 2 Y . It is sucient to prove that
for all w 2 W,  
y
r(w)   
y
n(w) for all y 2 Y .
First, let n = 1. By denition,  1 = (^ T^ r) r and  r = (^ Tr) r . Fix an arbitrary










 r(dz) =  
y
^ r(w);
where the inequality is due to the fact that w0
r(w;y)  w0
^ r(w;y) for all w 2 W.
Second, suppose that  
y
r(w)   
y
n 1(w); for all w 2 W and y 2 Y and show that it









P(d yjk(zr);l(zr))  y
r(zr);
where zr = maxfz 2 Wjw0
r(z;y)  wg and the equality follows from w0
r(w;y)
being continuous and increasing in its rst argument. Similarly,  
y
n(w) = R
 y2Y P(d yjk(zn);l(zn)) 
 y
n 1(zn); with zn = maxfz 2 Wjw0
^ r(z;y)  wg.
Lemma 6 implies that zr  zn: Then from the induction hypothesis it follows that
for all  y 2 Y ,  
 y
r(zr)   
 y
n 1(zn) and, therefore,  
y
r(w)   
y
n(w): 2
26Proof of Lemma 8















For r > ^ r, I need to prove that
R
W Vr(w) r(dw) 
R
W V^ r(w) ^ r(dw): Since  r stochas-
tically dominates  ^ r and Vr is strictly increasing,
R
W V^ r(w) r(dw) 
R
W V^ r(w) ^ r(dw);
it is enough to show that
R
W Vr(w) r(dw) 
R
W V^ r(w) r(dw): Dene fV ng1
n=1 by
V n = (Tn
^ r )Vr . From proofs above, the sequence fV ng1
n=1 converges uniformly to V^ r










optimal policies associated with fV ng1
n=1 and Vr, respectively.





c1(w;y) + (^ r + )k1(w)   y +
1









cr(w;y) + (^ r + )kr(w)   y +
1





by the principle of optimality. Integrating with respect to  r yields
Z
W




c1(w;y) + (^ r + )k1(w)   y +
1










cr(w;y) + (^ r + )kr(w)   y +
1













W Vr(w) r(dw) 
R
W V n 1(w) r(dw). To show that the same





cn(w;y) + (^ r + )kn(w)   y +
1










cr(w;y) + (^ r + )kr(w)   y +
1






using again the principle of optimality. Integrating as above with respect to  r obtains
Z
W




cn(w;y) + (^ r + )kn(w)   y +
1










cr(w;y) + (^ r + )kr(w)   y +
1











1 + ^ r
Vr(w;y) +
1











1 + ^ r
Vr(w;y) +
1










using (20) and the induction hypothesis for the last inequality. 2
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